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STOCKHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS IN THE CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATION-*
GEORGE D. HORNSTEINt
IN the field of corporation law, attention has principally been
focused on the large, publicly financed corporation. Most efforts have
been directed toward protecting the investing public against the
dangers inherent in the divorcement of ownership and control. Thus
there has been extensive consideration of such problems as frauds in
the promotion of the corporation, misappropriations by management
during its operation, and non-disclosures to stockholders designed to
stave off demands for a change in management.
Application of the term "corporation" is not limited, however, to
the gigantic publicly held corporation with its hundreds of thousands
of stockholders. The same name is also applied to the one-man cor-
poration and to the small corporation with but few participants, al-
though their problems are quite different from those of the large
corporation. In the small corporation where the stockholders are
often directors and officers, each member usually has a sense of per-
sonal responsibility which comes from handling his own funds. And
whereas the average lawyer will have occasion to advise on a problem
concerning a large corporation perhaps once or twice during his career,
he will probably have repeated experience with small corporations.
The corporate form is generally employed by a small business be-
cause the venturers want limitation of liability and certain imagined
tax advantages, precisely as does the single stockholder in the one-man
corporation. But at the same time, when the stockholders are more
than one, they generally prefer certain of the attributes of partner-
ship, particularly with respect to control and dissolution. In effect,
they want an "incorporated partnership."
The problem which these entrepreneurs and their legal advisors
face is to reconcile these aims with the corporate norms which have
been so often stated to be prerequisites of corporate existence. These
norms-originally formulated to protect the investing stockholders in
large corporations-include control of corporate activities by a board
of directors, rule by majority vote, free transferability of ownership
shares, and continuity of organizational life not terminated by the
death or withdrawal of a participant. To what extent does the cor-
porate form necessitate these corporate "norms" ?
Some "corporations," more than one would fancy, omit the barest
* The following article is the substance of an address delivered at the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, under the auspices of the Committee on Post Admission
Legal Education.
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minima of corporate norms. Having adopted the corporate form, some
business men proceed to disregard it completely and to operate as a
partnership. More often than not, the result is that eventually the
participants find themselves "hooked" as individuals for a partnership
liability which they thought had been avoided when their lawyer
handed them a corporate seal.
Another sizeable group comprehends the necessity for strictly ob-
serving the corporate form, acting by corporate resolutions, keeping
corporate books, maintaining a separate bank account for the cor-
poration, and filing corporate tax returns. Yet, feeling that he is really
a partner, each participant is willing to have his power to shape cor-
porate policies or to sell his stock determined by preliminary informal
"understandings." Such questions as the existence of the corporation
after withdrawal (or possibly death) of one of the original venturers
are given similar informal treatment. But too often it turns out that
each party has a different version of the understanding. From this
group, as a consequence, comes most of the bitter litigation involving
closely held corporations.
Finally, there are two other groups which also strictly observe the
corporate form. These groups reach an understanding as to deviations
from corporate "norms" and then embody their agreement in written
form, hoping thereby to avoid subsequent disputes. These agreements
are the device most successfully employed in the closely held corpora-
tion to mitigate the restrictiveness of traditional corporation law.
The first of these groups, the "Clark-Dodge type," involves a minor-
ity stockholder who wants protection in the form of a "veto power"
against conduct which he thinks may prejudice him. Sometimes he
is a one-third stockholder in business with another who holds two-
thirds of the stock. Sometimes he is one of three individual venturers
each owning a one-third interest, and each of whom is equally fearful
that his two fellows may gang up on him. Of course, the precise per-
centage of stock held is immaterial.
The other group, the "Long Park type," involves one or several
stockholders who want assurance that they will be able to control the
enterprise either for a period of years or for the life of the corporation.
They may own any amount of the stock. Yet regardless of how the
stock ownership may vary at the time or in the future, they want con-
trol vested in themselves. And their fellow venturers are willing to
grant it.
These last two groups are at opposite extremes. The one would give
every stockholder an absolute veto power over all action. The other
would prevent anyone but the original dominant participant from ever
having any voice. Both groups fear control by an independent board
of directors and fear a majority vote of stockholders which might
change the make-up of the board.
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CONTROL BY DIRECTORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
Whether management by the board of directors and ultimate con-
trol by the stockholders are norms which are essential to corporate
existence-whether conformity to them is the price which must be
paid for limited liability-are questions which courts have frequently
been called upon to decide. Although the goal of most investors in
closely held corporations is to get as close as possible to a partnership
without losing the advantages of incorporation, most courts will not
permit the parties to ignore these norms merely by their agreeing that
the incorporated venture shall be operated as a partnership.1 Numer-
ous dicta indicate, however, that if the stock certificates were issued
to "A and B, as partners," rather than to the parties severally, they
would be partners inter se while still enjoying the protection of limited
liability. 2 In these jurisdictions an elaborate partnership agreement
may be necessary to clarify the parties' rights. And if the practice
becomes wide-spread the legislature may enact laws to limit it.
Choice and Removal of Directors
In the absence of corrective legislation most courts will hold invalid
stockholders' agreements requiring that directors be elected by unan-
imous consent. In the Benintendi3 case, the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated a by-law calling for such unanimity. However, Section 9
of the New York Stock Corporation Law now authorizes such a re-
quirement.4
Although a general requirement of unanimity might not be valid,
an agreement signed by all stockholders to vote for certain specified
persons as directors would probably be valid and enforceable every-
where. In most states the agreement would be enforceable even if
some stockholders had not signed.6 In New York, certainly, even
without statute, a majority of the stockholders may assure the identity
of the board of directors'by committing themselves to vote for one
another or for other specified persons as directors.
If stockholders make. special provisions for the election of directors,
they may also want to vary the normal procedure for removal. Direc-
1. If the stock certificates were issued severally, the parties cannot enforce an agree-
ment that they will operate as a partnership. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 NJ. Eq. 592, 599, 75
Atl. 568, 571 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910). Contra: Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator
'Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926).
2. See Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 84, 181 N.W. 102, 104 (1921); King v. Barnes,
109 N.Y. 267, 288, 16 N.E. 332, 338 (1888).
3. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945).
4. So also in Delaware, provided the provision is in the charter. DEL. Rzv. CODE
§§2037(11), 2049 (1935).
5. In cases usually cited for the contrary it has been found on examination that the
courts were influenced by what they felt was an attempt to control the directors. See, e.g.,
Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 Ati. 369 (1930).
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tors ordinarily may not be removed without cause. Hence any under-
standing to the contrary should be recorded in the stockholders'
agreement and embodied in the certificate of incorporation or the
by-laws.
Appointment and Removal of Officers
Parties to stockholders' agreements seek more frequently to control
the power of the board of directors to appoint officers and managers
than the power to curtail any other exercise of the board's prerogatives.
The participants in the enterprise are entering a business from which
they expect to draw salaries. And since salaries are ordinarily paid
to officers, not directors, they may want to assure their appointment
as officers.
In more than a dozen states, as in England, the law permits or
directs that some or all officers be directly elected by the shareholders.6
In these jurisdictions a stockholders' agreement specifying who shall
hold these offices is probably valid. Other state corporation laws re-
quire that officers must be designated by the directors. In thes states,
most courts which have passed on the subject, including the New York
courts, have sustained composite agreements of all stockholders to
elect certain of their number as directors, and then as directors to
appoint designated persons (usually the directors) to particular offices
at stated salaries.7 Agreements to pay salaries may be enforceable
although the employment provision reads: "X shall devote only such
time to the business of the Corporation as he in his sole judgment shall
deem necessary." 8 Agreements that a holder of two-thirds of the stock
shall receive twice as much salary as the one-third holder are not in-
frequent.
Officers may ordinarily be removed widtlwut cause.' Hence, the agree-
6. All major officers (president, secretary, treasurer): D. R-v. CODE §2042
(1935) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1869 (Supp. 1947); MD. ANN. CoDo art. 23, § 11 (Flack
1939); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30021, 301.30 (Supp. 1949); NED. 1R:v. STAT. § 21-116
(1943) ; NJ. STAT. ANN. it. 14, c. 7, § 6 (Purdon 1939) ; N.M. STAT. A:.:i. § 54-215
(1941); N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 55-49, 55-114 (1943); PA. STAT. ANN-x. tit. 15, § 2852-405
(Purdon Supp. 1949) ; R.I. Gas. LAws ANN. c. 116, § 19 (1938) ; WVo. Colm. STAT. A;.
§ 44-116 (1945). In some states some single officer may be elected by the stockholders, the
president under VA. CODE § 13-200 (1950), and the treasurer under Ums. LAws ANN. c.
156, §22 (1948).
7. Where officers must be designated by the directors, there are still some states which
void such an agreement as an attempt to supersede the discretion of the directors. E.g.,
Borland v. Sass Printing Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32 P2d 827 (1934) ; Lothorp v. Godeau, 142
La. 342, 76 So. 794 (1917) ; Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 Ad. 369 (1930).
8. Matter of Seymour Grean & Co., 274 App. Div. 279, 82 N.Y.S2d 787 (1st Dep't
1948). But see Goldfarb v. Dorset Products, Inc., 82 N.Y.S2d 42, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Were creditors endangered, such provisions would be unenforceable.
9. E.g., N.Y. SToCK Cons. LAW § 60. The officer removed without cause may, how-
ever, be able to hold the corporation accountable in damages for breach of contract.
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ment must expressly provide the contrary if the parties so desire. This
may be accomplished by directing that each officer shall continue in
office so long as he proves "faithful, efficient and competent." 10 To
assure further protection for minority holders, a provision may be
included that termination of employment shall be by vote of not less
than a stated number of directors. Of course, such provision is of
practical effect only when coupled with a prohibition against an in-
crease in the number of directors.
A stockholders' agreement which attempts to protect an officer from
removal without cause may raise interesting problems of interpreta-
tion. The directors presumably continue to have the power to dictate
corporate policy, even though the agreement designates the officers,
their salaries, and their period of office. Moreover, the limitation that
the officer or employee may be discharged at any time for cause is
implicit in every employment agreement."x Query then if an officer
refuses to conform to the policy formulated by the board, would that
constitute "cause" for his removal?
Determination of Corporate Policy
Even though stockholders may validly agree to elect themselves
directors and to appoint specified persons as officers, they still may not
completely by-pass the board of directors by written agreement which
pre-empts virtually all directoral powers. In the recent case of Long
Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters Co. 2 the New York
Court of Appeals held invalid, as an infringement on the board of
directors' powers, a stockholders' agreement conferring on the holder
of fifty per cent of the corporation's stock broad powers to manage
theaters, hire and dismiss personnel, and vary entertainment policy
and admission price. This type of agreement had apparently previously
10. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). It is somewhat difficult to
reconcile the implicit condition of "competence" with the frequent provisions for con-
tinuance of salary in the event of incapacity of an officer, but perhaps the latter provision
will be upheld on the theory of a pension.
11. Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931).
12. 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948) ; Abbey v. Meyerson, 274 App. Div. 389, 83
N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd zithout opinion, 299 N.Y. 557, 85 N.E.2d 789 (1949).
The Long Park decision recalls that not so long ago it was the common practice of
investment trusts to sign precisely such "management contracts" with their sponsors
whereunder the latter over a long period and for a substantial fee was to handle all the
investments-the only actual business of the corporation. The New York decision, there-
fore, was in a sense anticipated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15, 54 STAT.
812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1946), which declares invalid any management contract
involving investment companies unless the contract is to be renewed annually and is subject
to termination on sixty days' notice.
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been vaiid in New York. 13 Virtually the same result can still be effected
to-day by the use of non-voting stock. 14
Attempts to control dividend policy have been more successful.
Probably no court would deny the validity of an agreement which
curtails directoral discretion by forbidding the declaration of dividends
under specified circumstances. A decision to the contrary would
seriously affect billions of dollars of bond indentures already in ex-
istence which rely on just that limitation. The converse agreement,
providing for compulsory dividends; has also been held valid; and,
where sufficiently detailed and explicit, has been enforced. In Clark
v. Dodge,'5 for example, the New York Court of Appeals did not feel
that the inclusion of a clause guarantying to the plaintiff for life one-
fourth of the corporation's net income "by way of salary or dividends"
rendered the agreement invalid.
The general principle, however, remains that the declaration of
dividends is within the discretion of the directors. Too many factors
are involved for all to be explicitly "detailed" by agreement in advance.
Hence, one cannot always rely upon the court's awarding specific
performance of any such contractual undertaking. In any event, such
a provision will have bargaining value. And when litigating a close
case it may carry some weight in swaying the court.
Rule by Majority Vote
In New York agreements requiring unanimity in special situations,
such as when making changes in the by-laws or in the number of di-
rectors, have long been recognized.' 6 But as late as 1945, the Court of
Appeals was unwilling to approve a by-law requiring that all actions
taken at directors' meetings be approved by unanimous consent.
Recent legislative changes, however, have validated stockholder's
attempts to vary the corporate norm of majority rule. Section 9 of
the New York Stock Corporation Law passed in 1948 provides that
the vote of any number of directors (e.g., unanimity) may be required
for the transaction of any business at a directors' meeting and, sim-
ilarly, that the votes of any number of stockholders may be required
for the transaction of any business at a stockholders' meeting. More-
over, Sections 35-39 passed in 1949 made significant changes with
respect to the minimum percentage of stockholder vote required for
13. Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N.Y. 384 (1881); Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit,
Inc., 144 Misc. 534, 259 N.Y. Supp. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
14. N.Y. STocK Coap. LAw § 51.
15. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). But the court construed the phrase as being
limited to "whatever was left for distribution after the directors had in good faith set aside
whatever they deemed wise." Id. at 417, 199 N.E. at 643.
16. Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855 (1912).
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structural changes. Previously structural changes had required the
approval of a majority of those entitled to vote in the case of less
important changes, two-thirds in the case of more important changes,
and two-thirds of those adversely affected in situations prejudicial to
a special class. The new sections now authorize change in each of these
three situations by the percentage stated only if the certificate of in-
corporation does not require a larger proportion. These legislative
changes now make it possible for stockholders to provide in advance for
a virtual veto.
Permitting the parties to require unanimous consent is not as revo-
lutionary as many imagine. Until comparatively recently, unanimous
consent was required in many states, including New York, for charter
and other organic changes and for the sale or mortgage of substantial
assets. This principle was altered only by statute. Nor is the sanction
of an agreement to require unanimity so very inconsistent with public
policy. Veto power is frequently demanded by one who, contributing
all the cash to an enterprise, receives only a minority of the stock.
Although veto power in a minority is subject to abuse, so is the voting
power of the majority. Full consideration should be given to both
dangers.
Dissolution
Stockholders may wish to include in their agreement special pro-
visions relating to dissolution. These provisions may be designed to
give a minority which feels oppressed the right to compel dissolution.
Or they may have as their purpose the prevention of dissolution where
such action would prejudice a minority.
Provisions of the first type, i.e., intended to compel dissolution, are
consistent with recent trends in corporate law. Until sixty years ago a
minority stockholder had never been able to force a dissolution, how-
ever inequitable the behavior of the majority. Now a number of ju-
risdictions have statutes which empower any minority holder to apply
for a court order "winding up" a company where its affairs are being
conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the membership.
In addition, it is fairly well established that if a strong enough case
can be proved, a court of equity has the power, even in the absence
of statute, to order dissolution. 7 This general equitable power has
been acknowledged by statute in some states. Section 9 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law, for example, permitting a requirement of
unanimity for all stockholders' and all directors' actions, provides that
17. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Cor-
poration at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 CoL. L. REv. 220 (1940). For a recent
New York decision upholding this power, see Lennan v. Blakeley, 273 App. Div. 767, 75
N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1947).
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nothing in the sectioh "shill be construed to limit the power of a court
of equity to decree a dissolution in a proper case."
Although stockholders in New York cannot validly agree to limit
or waive this power of a court of equity to grant dissolution, the de-
cisions are not clear as to how far an agreement can expand the parties'
power to compel dissolution. Would the courts, for example, enforce
a unanimous agreement by the stockholders that the corporation should
be dissolved when one of the parties dies, or enters a competing bus-
iness, or on some other equally foreseeable contingency? The Court
of'Appeals recently affirmed without opinion an Appellate Division
holding which had invalidated such an agreement because it attempted
to make a "partnership" of the corporation.18 Since the effect of
agreements to compel dissolution is unsettled, prompt legislative relief
is necessary.
Provisions by agreement enabling the minority to compel dissolu-
tion must be sharply distinguished from equally important provisions
to protect the minority from untimely dissolution. Here the interesting
question arises whether the parties, by unanimous agreement before
the issue of dissolution arises, may waive the absolute right which the
majority or fifty per cent shareholder would otherwise have to cause
dissolution. 19 In New York the parties may waive their rights to com-
pel dissolution under General Corporation Law Section 103, because
the statute expressly says so.20 An agreement can probably require,
moreover, that parties seeking dissolution show a real difference of
opinion between the parties in the enterprise as to management matters
and/or that dissolution would actually benefit all shareholders, not
merely the petitioners. 21
STOCK PUrChASE AN SALE AGREEMNTS
When a closely held corporation is first formed the parties are free
to select their business associates. Since the success of a small corpora-
tion may depend on the business acumen of the participants, the share-
holders may wish to make certain that they will not have to deal with
18. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 918, 77 N.Y.S2d 682 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd
without ophnion, 298 N.Y. 787, 83 N.E2d 473 (1948).
19. Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution: A ANeaw Dcvelopment in Intracorporatc Abuse,
51 YALE LJ. 64 (1941).
20. Cf. the dictum in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in Benintendi v.
Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 118, 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1945).
21. In a recently decided case, Application of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S2d
'604 (1st Dep't 1949), the Appellate Division held, one justice dissenting, that the owner of
fifty per cent of the corporation's stock could not cause dissolution under GEz. Cora. LAv
§§ 103, 117, where there was no real difference between the parties as to management policy
-and where the object of the dissolution was to enable petitioners to get complete control
of the business.
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possibly untalented or uncongenial associates in the future. Thus
they may wish to limit the group to whom shares may be sold or they
may wish to have the corporation dissolved in case some key member
or members withdraw or die. In concluding agreements to this effect,
the participants are varying the reputed corporate "norms" of free
transferability of shares and continuous corporate existence.
Restrictions on Transferability: Sale Agreements
An absolute prohibition on transfer is against public policy and
would be adjudged void, no matter how short the time specified. 2
Reasonable restrictions, however, are sanctioned. The Uniform Stock
Transfer Act (now in force in every one of the 48 states) impliedly
recognizes the validity of some restrictions by directing that a restric-
tion cannot be enforced unless noted on the stock certificate itself.2 '
A number of state statutes expressly authorize specific restrictions, 24
and judicial decisions sustain still others. The questions which arise
concerning restrictions on transferability are more frequently questions
of interpretation than of validity.
The restriction most frequently found is a prohibition against sale
of the stock to an outsider unless first offered for sale to the corporation
and to the remaining stockholders. The stockholders' rights are
usually, by express provision, proportioned to their respective holdings.
Whether the corporation or the existing stockholders have the first
chance to buy the stock is optional. Most agreements which the author
has seen require that the stock first be offered to the remaining stock-
holders, and then to the corporation. Whatever the.combination, it
is always referred to as a "first option" or "first refusal." The "first
option" to the corporation, or its stockholders, is sometimes extended
to its directors or officers. Similar to the "first option" agreement is
the frequent requirement that a stockholder who ceases to be employed
by the corporation must offer to sell his stock to the corporation or its
other shareholders. To avoid dispute, all agreements should clearly
state whether the limitations of "first option" shall continue to bind
the transferee when he wants to dispose of the stock.
The legality of these provisions may be circumscribed. A first
option to the corporation will be upheld only when the corporate
charter authorizes, expressly or implicitly, and when the state law
does not prohibit the purchase by the corporation of its own shares.
22. But see Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun. 641, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). Query the validity,
except as a "gentlemen's agreement," of the usual provision in a promoting or under-
writing syndicate that none of the participants will for six months dispose of shares of
stock acquired under the arrangement.
23. UNIFORM STocx Tp~NsFFR ACr § 15; N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAW § 176.
24. E.g., N.Y. STocx CORP. LAW § 66 (power of the corporation to refuse to transfer
stock where stockholder is indebted to corporation).
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In some states, as in New York, the corporation may not be free to
exercise the option at all times because of statutes prohibiting a cor-
poration from purchasing its own stock except out of surplus.
Other restrictions on transferability, such as requiring approval
by the directors or stockholders before a transfer may be effected, have
caused courts to divide sharply. Restrictions barring transfers to
certain persons, for example competitors or aliens, have likewise met
judicial opposition and are, therefore, infrequently used.
Withdrawal of Assets: Purch ase Agreements
Although the general subject is denominated "Purchase and Sale
Agreements," it must be remembered that an agreement to sell does
not necessarily imply an obligation on anyone to purchase. Preferably,
the purchase obligation should be included and expressly stated. Agree-
ments are necessary to protect not only stockholders remaining active
in the corporation but also those wishing to withdraw and survivors
inheriting the interest of an original venturer. As a practical matter,
remaining parties are usually the only prospective purchasers of stock
in a closely held corporation. Unless protected by an agreement com-
pelling the others in the enterprise to purchase at a fair price, the stock-
holder who withdraws must sell for whatever is offered. And the bid
is sometimes only a small fraction of the price which a sales agreement
had specified as the maximum which could be asked for the stock.
There are also certain practical considerations apart from legal
issues. If an agreement binds the corporation or remaining stockholders
to purchase the withdrawing venturers' shares, a formula for determin-
ing selling price should always be included. Such a formula for a fair
price can usually be readily agreed upon before the enterprise is started,
since it is not known at that time which of the parties will be the buyer
and which the seller. It is certainly easier to reach agreement upon
such a formula in advance than it is when buyer and seller bicker with
keen monetary interest in the result. The usual provision in an agree-
ment is for "book value." This ordinarily will mean cost to the cor-
poration or market value, whichever is lower. A carefully drafted in-
strument will expressly state whether "good-will" is to be included.
If so, the agreement should specify how earnings are to be capitalized,
over what period, on what percentage basis, and what allowance, if
any, shall be made for loss of good-will resulting from loss of the with-
drawing participant. Additional provisions in a well-drafted agreement
will set forth whether and on what basis other intangible assets such
as patents and tangible ones such as capital assets and inventory shall
be valued,; how accounts receivable are to be computed and reserves
thereon determined, and whether allowance shall be made for possible
corporate income tax liabilities.
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As an alternative to a formula for ascertaining value, the parties
have sometimes set a specified price, usually par value, to be in effect
for a number of years. The fluctuations resulting from the vagaries
of business, however, make a specified price unsafe. This method of
price determination may also have the effect of causing one of the
parties to watch for the best moment to exercise his rights under the
stockholders' agreement rather than to devote his energies to building
up the mutually-owned business. Finally, arbitration or appraisal
in a specified manner is a method commonly used to determine a fair
price.
Tax consequences may be influential in deciding the method of
arriving at the selling price. A definite formula for price fixing, if
arrived at bona fide when the agreement is made, can determine the
value of a stock interest for estate tax purposes. This is true even
though the actual value of the stock at time of death may be many
times higher than the value arrived at by use of the formula. To be
effective for estate tax purposes, however, the agreement for sale at a
definitely ascertainable price must have been binding during life as
well as on death. 5 The necessity for definiteness renders inadvisable
agreements which leave the price to be fixed by arbitration. Care must
be taken, of course, that the stock be not redeemed in such a way as to
constitute a taxable dividend.
The efficacy of stock purchase provisions is closely related to the
corporate balance sheet. In several states, as has been indicated, the
corporation's agreement to purchase its own stock becomes unenforce-
able if there be no surplus.2 6 In a sense, the agreement is subject to a
condition subsequent which makes it unenforceable for lack of mu-
tuality.2 If corporate finances are close enough to the borderline so
that the existence of a surplus can be a matter of accounting dis-
cretion, there is also the danger in these states that the agreement may
be deliberately evaded through accounting techniques.
Provision may also be made for payment of the purchase price in
cash or on time. To make sure the cash is available when wanted, life
insurance policies are frequently arranged. A further provision for
compulsory liquidation in the event the survivors or the corporation
defaults on its obligations under the purchase part of the agreement
may be desirable.
Apart from the agreement proper, the stockholder ought to be re-
minded that his last will and testament should direct executors to
25. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1932).
26. In some states, the purchase can be made only out of earned surplus.
27. Topken, Loring & Schwartz v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E: 735 (1928).
The agreement to repurchase is, however, binding upon the corporation if it does have a
surplus when the prescribed contingency occurs.
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perform any stockholders' agreement to which he may be a party at
the time of death and if there is only a sale (not a purchase) agreement,
that the will should empower them to retain the shares of stock as
part of the estate. Where the latter provision is omitted, executors and
trustees may be forced to sell the shares of stock immediately to avoid
the possibility of surcharge, and there is great danger that they may
have to be sacrificed. Executor discretion, however, may have an effect
upon marital deductions under the new federal estate law, a danger
not yet definitely evaluated but which must not be overlooked. Agree-
ments binding stockholders to bequeath stock either to the other
stockholders or to the corporation, conditioned upon the legatee paying
its value or some agreed sum to the estate of the deceased, are inad-
visable, in the opinion of the writer, since there is some question as to
the possibility of enforcement should the bequest not be made.
ARBITRATION
Stockholders' agreements, like most other agreements, cannot be
drafted to cover all possible contingencies. A provision for arbitration
is therefore frequently included. Since 1920, when New York took the
lead in empowering the courts to enforce both agreements to arbitrate
and arbitration awards, experience has shown that these agreements
do reduce disputes, often to the point that the formal process of ar-
bitration is unnecessary. The differences which arise between parties
reach a tension point less often when it is known that a speedy de-
termination of any disputes will result. Valuation of stock is the one
subject usually excepted from the provision for arbitration because, as
noted earlier in this article, a price to be fixed by arbitration is presently
in advisable taxwise. 2
The arbitration clause most frequently employed reads as follows:
"Should at any time any dispute arise between any one or more
of the parties hereto with respect to his or their rights, obligations,
duties and requirements under and by virtue of the provisions of
this agreement, except as to the valuation of stock, said dispute,
except as aforesaid, shall be referred to, and consent and approval
of each of the parties hereto is expressly given to refer said dispute
for determination to the American Arbitration Association, whose
determination and/or decision shall be final and binding upon the
parties hereto, and there shall be no appeal from said decision."
This clause or one substantially similar has been enforced by New York
courts a number of times. 29 When arbitration has been rejected by the
28. Chase Nat. Bank v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 39 N.Y.S2d 370 (1st
Dep't 1943).
29. Mfartocci v. Martocci, 42 N.Y.S2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd uithout opiion,
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courts, the reason has been either that the contract as a whole was
basically illegal and hence the arbitration clause fell with it,3" or that
the controversy was not within the scope of the arbitration clause."
For example, the courts have nullified arbitration clauses when they
were included in the following types of contract adjudged illegal:
agreement requiring a unanimous vote of stockholders for the election
of directors; 32 agreement interpreted to prevent directors from ousting
one of their number for dishonesty; 11 agreement for management of
the corporation not by its directors, but exclusively by holders of one
class of stock; 34 agreement treating the corporation as a "partner-
ship" by providing for its dissolution (distribution of its assets) on
specified contingencies.3 5
As yet it is not certain whether an arbitration agreement could
bar a stockholders' derivative suit for violations by directors or of-
ficers of fiduciary duties. Usually the New York courts have ordered
arbitration 11 while refusing stay of the derivative suit.3" Where an
arbitration clause admittedly was "very broad and unambiguous,"
the court frankly ordered arbitration to proceed on the identical issues
which were the subject of a contemporaneous stockholders' derivative
suit.,,
New York judges take a similar position that arbitration clauses are
ineffective to stay applications for dissolution under the General
Corporation Law.39 Two cases explained that arbitration cannot com-
266 App. Div. 840, 43 N.Y.S2d 516 (1st Dep't 1943), leave to appeal denied, 266 App. Dlv.
917,43 N.Y.S.2d 517; Matter of Seymour Grean & Co., Inc., 274 App. Div. 279, 82 N.Y.S.2d
787 (1st Dep't 1948); In re Feinberg, 118 N.Y.L.J. 20, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. July 3, 1947);
Matter of Panhandle Producing & Refining Co., Inc., 117 N.Y.L.J. 447, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
Feb. 4, 1947).
30. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261,271-2, 130 N.E. 2R, 290 (1920).
31. Matter of Kelly, 240 N.Y. 74, 78, 147 N.E. 363, 364 (1925). For an application
of this principle in a stockholders' agreement see Matter of Richman, 114 N.Y.L.J. 1878,
col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 1945).
32. In re Berman, 107 N.Y.L.J. 1902, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. May 5, 1942). The subject-
matter of this type of agreement would now be adjudged valid if certain formalities were
observed. N.Y. SrocK CoaR. LAW § 9, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1948, c. 862.
33. Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st
Dep't 1934), leave to appeal denied, 266 N.Y. lv (1934).
34. Matter of Abbey v. Meyerson, 274 App. Div. 389, 83 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1948),
aff'd, 299 N.Y. 557, 85 N.E.Zd 789 (1949).
35. Matter of Flanagan, 271 App. Div. 1014, 68 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1947). For
the facts, see opinions cited in memorandum decision in Flanagan v. Flanagan, 298 N.Y.
787, 83 N.E.2d 473 (1948).
36. Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. & Taylor, Inc., 242 App. Div. 852, 275 N.Y. Stipp, 221
(2d Dep't 1934) ; Matter of Ehrlich, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1093, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 1949).
37. Matter of Diamond, 80 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd without opinion, 274
App. Div. 762, 79 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1st Dep't 1948).
38. Matter of Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2d Dep't 1942).
39. N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW §§ 101, 103.
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pel a holder of 50% of the stock to continue in a state of constant war-
fare with the remaining 50% interest. 41 Still other judges expressed
the view that management of a corporate enterprise by arbitrators is re-
pugnant to the concept of corporate structure., This view is not shared
by the California legislature, which has provided that when there
is a deadlock in a board of directors the court is empowered to appoint
a disinterested person as provisional director to act as a director until
the deadlock be broken, or until he be removed by order of the court
or by vote or written consent of the holders of a majority of the voting
shares.42 One New York court, it should be noted, denied an applica-
tion for dissolution suggesting that the charge of mismanagement
(urged as proof that the dissolution sought would be beneficial to the
corporation) did appear to be a fit question for arbitration.4 3
The Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey case in Delaware illustrates
another use of arbitration clauses. There, two sisters had agreed to
vote alike since their combined votes could elect five out of seven
directors. The agreement also provided that if they failed to agree
they would cast their votes as a designated third person should direct.
The parties failed to agree and the issue was submitted to the arbitra-
tor. One sister followed the arbitrator's instructions; the other did
not. The court enforced the arbitration award and cancelled the vote
of the disobedient sister.44 This device may not be available in New
York where "agreements to agree" appear unenforceable.' 5
The category of illegal contracts, the writer predicts, will be narrowed
with the passage of time, 6 whereas the matter to be arbitrated will
be widened as more agreements employ a standard form. Until the
law with respect to arbitration is better settled some other neat ques-
tions may come up. For example, one loses his right under an arbi-
tration agreement by proceeding to suit.a Query then whether he
40. Matter of Cohen, 183 Misc. 1034, 52 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct 1944), aff'd without
opinion, 269 App. Div. 663, 53 N.Y.S.2d 467 (lst Dep't 1945), leave to appeal denied, 269
App. Div. 690,54 N.Y.S2d 389, and 294 N.Y. 639,61 N.E.2d 459 (1945) ; In re Dome Trad-
ing Corp., 114 N.Y.LJ., 514, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1945).
41. Matter of Hess, 108 N.Y.L.J. 555, col. 5 (Sup. Ct Sept. 11, 1942).
42. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 819,4655 (1947).
43. Application of Gail Kiddie Clothes, Inc., 56 N.Y.S2d 117 (Sup. Ct 1945).
44. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 49 A2d
603 (Del. Ch. 1946), nodified, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). Contra: Roberts v. Whitson.
188 S.W2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
45. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 120, 60 N.E2d 829, 832
(1945).
46. How will courts which still shy at the thought of directors' surrendering this type
of managerial power to an arbitrator treat "union"e contracts which require that wage
disputes with non-executive employees be determined by arbitration?
47. Matter of Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N.Y. 244, 251, 14S N.E. 510,
511 (1925).
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can ask for arbitration if he has first sued and the court rules that he
was bound to arbitrate?
Lawyers still perform a service in the arbitrative process. The Rules
of the American Arbitration Association, the organization usually
employed, expressly provide that parties may be represented by
counsel. Statistics show that lawyers represent clients in eighty-two
per cent of the commercial matters submitted to arbitration. The great
advantage of arbitration is that it speeds up decision once a controversy
has materialized.
OTHER DRAFTING PROBLEMS
A number of miscellaneous matters must be considered when an
agreement is being drafted. For example, the time of the agreement is
important. Some provisions are ineffective unless written into the
certificate of incorporation itself. Accord upon such provisions must
be reached before that document is drafted and sent to the Secretary of
State. Illustrative of these provisions are the following: all the pro-
visions permitted by the new Sections 9 and 37 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law; provisions for classification of stock, an important
device for assuring each stockholder the power to name a given number
of directors; and certain restrictions upon the transfer of stock, such
as the power of the corporation to refuse to transfer stock held by a
stockholder who is indebted to the corporation." If not in the original
certificate, an amendment thereto will be required before such objects
can be effected. Even though inclusion in the certificate of incorpora-
tion may not be essential for some provisions, it still may be preferable
to insert them since then shares which subsequently come into existence
cannot be transferred except in accordance with the limitations there
specified.4 1
Provisions invalid in a certificate of incorporation or by-law have in
many states been held binding upon the parties as if they had been
included in a stockholders' agreement to the same effect. In New
York, however, the minority in the Beninlendi 11 case were unable to
sway the majority into adopting this view. At the time the provisions
there involved would probably have been equally unenforceable bad
they been in a stockholders' agreement in the first place.
A well-drafted stockholders' agreement will always direct that
there be endorsed on every stock certificate an appropriate legend
referring to the restrictions and to the stockholders' agreement. This
48. N.Y. STocK Copp. LAv § 66.
49. The certificate of incorporation, according to § 13(2) of the New York General
Corporation Law "may contain any provision for the regulation of its business and the
conduct of its affairs, and any limitation upon its powers, or upon the rights of its stock-
holders, or upon the powers of its directors and members, which does not exempt them from
the performance of any obligation or duty imposed by law."
50. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
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is especially important since Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act prohibits restrictions on transfer not stated upon the certificate.
Nevertheless, when representing the purchaser of stock in a close
corporation already formed, one must bear in mind that restraints
upon transfer of stock may be binding, although they do not appear
either on the stock certificate or in the certificate of incorporation,
because the buyer had knowledge of the by-law or written agreement.
Moreover, in some instances he may be charged with knowledge
whether he actually had it or not.
Who should be the parties to the agreement? All the stockholders,
we assume, have concurred, since anything less than unanimity of
stockholders creates problems beyond the scope of this article (except
as noted with respect to the choice of directors). The agreement should
provide that it shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, legal rep-
resentatives and assigns of the original parties. Although the cor-
poration actually need not be a party unless it assumes obligations or
may benefit under the agreement, a worldly-wise draftsman includes
the corporation.
Drafting a stockholders' agreement requires an understanding of
psychology, adeptness in negotiation, skill in draftsmanship, and a
broad knowledge of corporate law and its background. In working
out the details of these agreements, the lawyer should remember that
their purpose is to prevent later dispute and litigation. If carefully
drafted, they do."' After a stockholders' agreement has been entered
into, should a dispute arise the written agreement plays an important
part in the bargaining process both before and during litigation.
CONCLUSION
We shall have stockholders' agreements as long as we have "close"
corporations. Is there any reason why the courts should not sanction
in these agreements provisions which deviate from the so-called
corporate "norms"? Let us apply the test of public policy, -52 for
example, to the first "norm" allegedly required, management by the
board of directors. In a recent case, a Virginia court declared that
51. The author's records indicate that of cases in New York County involving
stockholders' agreements, less than ten a year on the average reach litigation. This is
probably less than one per cent of the number of stockholders' agreements actually signed.
Most of the cases naturally develop in the Supreme Court, but a small number show up in
the Surrogate's Court, after one of the parties to the agreement has died or when the pro-
visions of a will (by a testator who was the sole stockholder of a corporation) contain
orders to trustees to elect directors who are to employ specified beneficiaries at stated
salaries.
52. The alleged public policy against stockholders' agreements probably may be
traced back to the 1890s when stock-pooling agreements were among the legal forms de-
vised to evade the antitrust laws. Cf. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890).
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"a private business corporation without a board of directors is an im-
possible concept." 53 But is it so impossible? In England, whence we
used to get all our concepts about corporations, until last year no board
of directors at all was required in a "private company," 14 a form of
organization which approximates our close corporation. And one state
in this country, Iowa, does not require a board of directors. "
Nevertheless, in three-quarters of the states there is a statutory dec-
laration like that in New York reading, "The business of a corporation
shall be managed by its board of directors." 11 Does this prohibit a
unanimous agreement of stockholders telling the directors how they
are to manage the corporation? The question almost answers itself.
The New York Court of Appeals, although not always consistent, did
in Clark v. Dodge render an unequivocal, four-square decision, uphold-
ing a stockholders' agreement covering this problem. The court merely
noted that all stockholders were parties to the agreement and that no
damage was threatened to anyone.17 And this decision was cited with
approval by the majority as well as by the minority in the Benintendi
case. 58
New needs compel fresh formulation of corporate "norms." There
is no reason why mature men should not be able to adapt the statutory
form to the structure they want, so long as they do not endanger other
stockholders, creditors, or the public, or violate a clearly mandatory
provision of the corporation laws. In a typical close corporation the
stockholders' agreement is usually the result of careful deliberation
among all initial investors. In the large public-issue corporation, on
the other hand, the "agreement" represented by the corporate charter
is not consciously agreed to by the investors; they have no voice in
its formulation, and very few ever read the certificate of incorporation.
Preservation of the corporate norms may there be necessary for the
protection of the public investors.
In most respects, the courts do hold stockholders' agreements bind-
ing on the parties, if fairly entered into and free from fraud. Limita-
tions which the courts still impose will probably be gradually lessened
-if not by the courts, then by the legislatures.
53. Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 335, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944).
54. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 39, § 176.
55. See IowA CODE (1946).
56. N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 27.
57. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
58. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E2d 829 (1945).
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